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ABSTRACT
Aircraft flight characteristics at high angles of attack can be improved by controlling vortices
shed from the nose. These characteristics have been investigated with the integration of the actu-
ated nose strakes for enhanced rolling (ANSER) control system into the NASA F-18 High Alpha
Research Vehicle. Several hardware and software systems were developed to enable performance
of the research goals. A strake interface box was developed to perform actuator control and failure
detection outside the flight control computer. A three-mode ANSER control law was developed
and installed in the Research Flight Control System. The thrust-vectoring mode does not command
the strakes. The strakes and thrust-vectoring mode uses a combination of thrust vectoring and
strakes for lateral--directional control, and strake mode uses strakes only for lateral-directional
control. The system was integrated and tested in the Dryden Flight Research Center (DFRC) sim-
ulation for testing before installation in the aircraft. Performance of the ANSER system was mon-
itored in real time during the 89-flight ANSER flight test program in the DFRC Mission Control
Center. One discrepancy resulted in a set of research data not being obtained. The experiment was
otherwise considered a success with the majority of the research objectives being met.
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INTRODUCTION
The F-18 High Alpha ResearchVehicle (HARV) flown at DrydenFlight ResearchCenter
(DFRC),Edwards,California,is a flight testplatform for theHigh-Angle-of-AttackTechnology
Program(HATP). OneHATP objectiveinvolvesimproving aircraftcontrollability andagility at
highanglesof attack(ref. 1).Thefirst phaseof theprograminvestigatedhigh-angle-of-attackaero-
dynamicsin a baselineF-18configuration.During thesecondphase,theaircraftwasmodifiedby
integratingaresearchflight controlsystem(RFCS)with thebasicF-18controlsystem.TheRFCS
allowsvariousflight control lawsto be flown. ThestandardF-18systemprovidesinput, output,
redundancymanagement,andsafebackupfor theRFCS.A thrust-vectoring(TV) systemwasalso
addedto theHARV. Thismodificationincludestheadditionof TV vanesto deflectengineexhaust
for high-angle-of-attackmaneuvering.
The third and final phaseinvestigatedan alternatecontrol methodologyfor high-angle-of-
attackmaneuvering.LangleyResearchCenter(LaRC),Hampton,Virginia, developedasystemto
applyforcing momentsto thenoseof theaircraftbycontrollingthevorticesshedfrom thenoseat
highanglesof attack(ref. 2).Theactuatednosestrakefor enhancedrolling (ANSER)systemcon-
sistsof two actuatedcontrol surfacesinstalledin aspeciallyconstructedradome(fig. 1).
Figure1.TheF-18HARV.
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TheDFRC integratedtheANSERsystemwith theRFCSandaircraftsystemsandconducted
the flight researchto accomplishthesetasks.Severalhardwareand softwaresystemswere
designedanddeveloped.Thispaperdescribesthesystemsdevelopedto integratetheANSERinto
theaircraftandintegrationtesting.Someof thetechnologiesdevelopedtoenableaccomplishment
of the researchobjectivesarediscussed.Useof tradenamesor namesof manufacturersin this
documentdoesnot constitutean official endorsement of such products or manufacturers, either
expressed or implied, by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
SYSTEM OVERVIEW
The ANSER installation was designed to use full actuator authority to provide 90 ° of strake
deflection (fig. 1). These strakes are commanded independently by control laws residing in the
RFCS computers with two independent channels controlling each strake. The RFCS computers are
F-18 flight control computers modified by the addition of a second processor running parallel and
sharing data with the main processor. Figure 2 shows a top-level diagram of the control system.
The RFCS software is written in Ada and cross-compiled on a UNIX®-based workstation. The
compiled software is then downloaded to the RFCS.
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Figure 2. The F-18 HARV ANSER control system.
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The RFCS control laws can be engaged with weight on the wheels or when the aircraft is in a
predefined Mach number, M, and altitude, h, flight envelope (15,000 ft < h < 45,000 ft, M < 0.7)
by first arming the system with a cockpit-mounted toggle switch, then engaging with a push button
on the control stick. Research objectives required operation of the strakes both in conjunction with
and independent of the TV system, resulting in a multimode control law implementation. Upon
engagement, the RFCS defaults to TV mode in which the strakes are commanded closed at all
times. Strakes and thrust-vectoring (STV) and strake (S) modes are selectable via a push button on
the digital display indicator (DDI).
®UNIX is a registered trademark of UNIX System Laboratories, Inc.
Unlike the other control surfaces, which are only commanded by the RFCS control laws while
RFCS is engaged (ref. 3), the strakes are commanded by the RFCS control laws at all times through
previously unused analog outputs. Similarly, actuator control for the conventional surfaces and TV
vanes are performed by the flight control computer (FCC); meanwhile, the strakes are controlled
by an external interface box.
HARDWARE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
Control of the strakes is performed by two electrically controlled, hydraulically powered
servoactuators. These actuators are F-18 aileron actuator servovalves mounted to a longer, narrow-
er main piston and cylinder. The strake actuator piston length is 5.68 in. _+0.05 in. in place of the
4.38 in. _+0.05 in. as installed on the standard actuator. The actuators are dual redundant. Either
channel can drive the surface. Hydraulic supply is single string to both actuators. The hydraulics
are plumbed to the gun hydraulic quick disconnect located in the nose barrel section of the aircraft.
Integration of the strake actuators with the FCS required the addition of actuator control loop
closure and failure detection for the strake actuators. These functions are normally performed in
the FCC software. However, insufficient FCC input--output (I/O) availability required implemen-
tation of these functions external to the FCC in a strake interface box (SIB). The RFCS strake com-
mands are passed through a previously unused digital-to-analog converter (DAC) to the servoloop
located in the SIB. The servoloop performs loop closure and sends a rate command to the actuator.
Several control loop signals are monitored by the failure-detection circuitry, which sends a go/no
go signal back to the RFCS via a previously unused analog-to-digital converter (ADC). If a no go
signal is received, the RFCS automatically reverts to TV mode and commands the strake to close.
The SIB contains two independent channels of actuator control and failure detection. Each SIB
channel controls one channel of each actuator (fig. 2).
Because the actuators used to drive the strakes are modified F-18 actuators, spare servoloop
circuit cards were modified for use in the SIB to reduce manufacturing costs for a newly designed
card. These cards were originally designed for use in the thrust-vectoring vane (TVV) system. The
servoloop cards contain three identical servoloops of which two were used for the strake system.
Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the servoloop board. Servoloop integrity is monitored by com-
paring the command output to that of a servoloop model which runs in parallel with the actual
servoloop. A miscompare results in generation of a failure signal which is passed to the failure-
detection circuitry for system monitoring. In addition to the servoloop function, this card performs
all signal conditioning necessary for signal usage by the failure-detection logic. The card also re-
ceives discrete information back from the failure-detection logic for use in the servovalve and shut-
off valve driver circuitry. This card was originally intended to be addressed by the FCC, so minor
modifications were made to permanently enable discrete I/O of the board. A 1.8432-MHz clock
was also added to these boards to trigger a programmable array logic (PAL) integrated circuit.
The software failure detection routines implemented in the FCC for the TVV actuators were
also implemented in the SIB for the strake system. These routines include a comparison of servo-
valve command current to servovalve position (fig. 4), a main ram linear variable displacement
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Figure 4. Spool position versus servocurrent test.
transformer (LVDT) monitor (fig. 5), and a hydraulic pressure sensor monitor (fig. 6). Each of
these tests generates a discrete signal which is passed back to the servoloop board for actuator shut-
off valve and servovalve relay control. Figure 7 shows the relay control logic. As shown in figure 7,
the failures would self-reset upon clearing with no manual reset capability. A built-in test (BIT)
circuit was integrated into the design which sequentially interrupts various actuator control signals
to verify the integrity of the failure-detection circuitry (fig. 8). Because a processor was not
designed into the system, monitoring of the BIT was performed manually in the Mission Control
Center (MCC) before each flight. Although not as efficient as an automatic system, this approach
proved adequate for this system.
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Figure 5. Ram LVDT monitor.
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The SIB is powered by two independent power supply modules which regulate aircraft 28 Vdc
and convert it to +15 Vdc, 5 Vdc, and 8 Vrms LVDT excitation. The LVDT excitation frequencies
are programmable by selecting one of various jumper configurations at the power supply. To elim-
inate beat frequency development between channels, the two strake channels were given different
LVDT excitation frequencies. As with the servoloop boards, existing FCC power supplies were
used to eliminate development costs. The power supply modules, servoloop boards, and failure-
detection boards were housed in a locally manufactured enclosure (fig. 9). The box was mounted
in the radome aft of and between the strake actuators.
Figure 9. Power supply modules, servoloop boards, and failure-detection boards.
The design goal for the strake control system was fail-operate/fail-safe. The fail-safe mode
placed the affected actuator into trail-damped mode, in which the actuator shutoff valves are
opened, causing hydraulic fluid to bypass the main ram. The surface then floats freely, thus not
generating a forcing moment on the aircraft. However, testing showed that the airflow over the
strake did not generate enough force to overcome the breakout force and friction of the strake
actuator and linkage while in trail-damped mode. Thus, the strake was essentially stuck in its last
position. Evaluations of a stuck strake conducted in the DFRC F- 18 simulation showed that an un-
recoverable departure could occur at angles of attack of 50 ° or higher with a strake fully deployed.
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This discoveryled to implementationof apilot-initiatedsystemto bypassthecontrol systemand
forcethestrakesto thefully retractedpositionin theeventof astuckstrake.A switchaddedto the
cockpit providedpowerto four independentrelayswhich overrodethe shutoff valvesandcom-
mandedthe actuatorsto fully retract independentof the control systemcommands.Figure 10
showsthis logic.
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Figure 10. Strake retract system.
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Cockpit modifications to accommodate the strake system were minimal. In addition to the
strake retract switch, two toggle switches were added to initiate the BIT logic. Two override
switches were also added to manually interrupt the shutoff valve driver signal and place the
actuators in the trail-damped mode. The override switches were only used in ground operations
although no measures were taken to prohibit their functionality in flight. A failure indication was
added to the warning light panel to indicate any failures in the system. Display modifications that
required updates to the mission computer (MC) software included the addition of a mode transition
button and a gain select button to the FCS display on the DDI and a mode and gain set display on
the head-up display (HUD). Figures 11 and 12 show the DDI and HUD symbologies. The onboard
augmented vehicle (OAV) engagement button and maneuver selections button for the onboard
excitation system (OBES) were already present from phase 2 of flight test. The FCS DDI page was
used to select ANSER modes, dial-a-gain settings, OAV maneuvers, and OBES engagement. The
HUD was used to display RFCS engagement, OBES engagement, ANSER modes, and dial-a-gain
settings. No indication of strake position was presented in the cockpit.
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Figure 12. The HARV head-up display.
SOFTWARE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
The ANSER software was developed using two methods: hand coding from a specification and
automatic code generation. The software for the ANSER can be divided into nine elements. These
12
elementsconsistof the existingshell,lateral-directionalcontrollaws, longitudinalcontrol laws,
pseudocontrols,TV mixer (ref. 4), modelogic,G-disengage,dial-a-gain,andOBES.This section
discussesthesesoftwareelementsanddesignmethodologiesin moredetailwith theexceptionof
theTV mixer.
The RFCSexecutesat 160Hz in 16minor frames;the longitudinalcontrol laws executeat
80Hz in the even minor frames;and the lateral-directionalcontrol laws, pseudocontrols,and
TV mixer executeat 80 Hz in the oddminor frames.Eachminor frameis 6.25mseclong with
therequirementthat the RFCScommandsto the processorbe computedby the 2.2-msecmark.
These2.2msecwerethecritical throughputrequirement.Read-onlymemory(ROM) wasalso a
concern.The RFCS had only 32 kilobytes of electrically erasableprogrammableread-only
memory(EEPROM).
Hand-CodedSoftware
TheANSERcontrollaw softwarewasdesignedanddevelopedfrom theHARV ANSERcon-
trol law specificationwrittenby theVehicleDynamicsandtheDynamicsandControlsBranches
of LaRC.ExistingRFCSsoftwarewasusedasabaselinefor theANSERcontrollaws(ref. 5).The
control law softwarewas removed,and the existing shell containingthe multirate structure,
disarm-disengagementlogic,grossthrustestimator,andRFCSI/O softwarewasretained(fig. 13).
TheTV portionof theANSERcontrollawswasimplementedandflown first independentlyfrom
thestrakeinterfaces,followedby thecompleteANSERcontrollaws.
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Because of limited memory and throughput of the RFCS, the code was periodically reworked
to reduce the amount of memory it used. To reduce the risk of throughput problems, the software
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waswrittenasefficiently aspossible.Themultiratestructureonly processedinputsat therateand
frameat whichtheywereupdated.Airdataandinertial navigationsystem(INS) angleswereinput
at 20 Hz. Angle of attack (AOA) and angleof sidesliprate([3) inertial wereinput at 40 Hz.
Although pilot commandsandrateand accelerationfeedbackswereinput at 40 and 80 Hz, the
40Hz signalswereprocessedat80Hz andaveragedto providecontinuousdatato thecontrollaws.
Only processingrequired to computecommandoutputswas completedin the critical first
2.2msec.All othercomputationswereprocessedaftercompletionof thecommandoutputcompu-
tationbutbeforethe6.25msecendof frame.
Usingthehorizontalblock diagramsprovidedin thecontrol law specification,a control law
input listing wasgeneratedto verify thatthe requiredinputswereavailableto the control laws.
Next, eachaxiswasmodularized,anddataflow pathsweredetermined.Figure14showsanexam-
ple of a dataflow pathdiagram.Oncethedataflow wasdetermined,theexecutionorderof the
moduleswaseasilydeterminedbasedon thedataflow. Theexecutionorderensuredthat outputs
werecomputedbeforebeingusedasinputsto otherportionsof the system.Oncethedataflow,
executionorder,computationrates,input availability,andsoftwaremodularityweredetermined,
the softwarewascoded.Thereviewprocessat thecodelevelconsistedof informalcodereviews
and limited modulelevel andend-to-endtesting.The modulelevel andend-to-endtestingwere
performedusingtheRFCSsourcecodeonaworkstation.
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Figure 14. Lateral-directional control law data flow.
Automatic Code Generation
In developing the ANSER control laws specification, LaRC extensively used computer
generated software code in both FORTRAN and Ada using MATRIXx .® Using automatic code
®MATRIX X is a registered trademark of Integrated Systems, Inc., Palo Alto, California.
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generationreducedthe time requiredto makechangesto the control law and to evaluatethe
changesin simulation,thusshorteningthe time requiredbetweencontrol law modification and
flight test.
TheFORTRAN from theautomaticcodegenerationwasusedin theLaRCsimulationsandin
theDFRCbatchsimulation.Whenchangesweremadeto thecontrollaws,softwarewasregener-
atedusingtheautomaticcodegeneratorandinterfacedto thesimulations.Check-casescriptsand
time historieswerealsoprovidedfor usein verifyingtheimplementation.Thisprocedureoffered
considerablesavingsin time over thetraditionalprocessof hand-codingthechanges,evaluating
them,andthenprovidingthechangesto programmersin theform of block diagramsto behand-
codedin that simulation.Of course,small changes,suchaschangingthe valuesof a few vari-
ables,werestill completedby handdirectlyin thecode.
To completethis processof automation,carryingtheautomaticcodegenerationall theway to
flight wasdesired.Someobstacleswerein this path,however.Theautomaticallygeneratedcode
wasnotasefficient ashand-codedsoftwarein termsof executionspeedandmemory.This obsta-
cle wasseriousbecausethe RFCSwasoperatingnearcapacityin memoryandexecutiontime.
Second,the softwaregenerationtool did not include a multirate capability. In spite of these
obstacles,it wasdecidedto usetheautomaticallygeneratedcodefor thepseudocontrolsportion
of the lateral-directionalcontrol law to run in the RFCS.The automaticallygeneratedcodefor
thepseudocontrolswasmodified to accommodatethe differencesbetweenthe simulationsand
theRFCS.
ModeLogic
Becausethe ANSER control lawshad threeseparatecontrol law modes(TV, STV, andS),
allowingin-flight selectionsof thesemodeswasrequired.A modeselectionsystemwas,therefore,
incorporatedinto theRFCS.Thrustvectoringwasselectedasthedefaultmode;therefore,when-
everRFCSwasnot engaged,thecontrolslaws werein theTV mode.In addition,upon RFCS
engagement,the TV modewasselected.Transitionsto the STV andS modeswere performed
throughasinglemodeselectbuttonon theFCSpageontheDDI. A singlebuttonwasusedbecause
of memoryconstraintsin theMC. The pilot usesthis modeselectbutton to togglethroughthe
modes,TV ---)STV---)S ---)TV (fig. 15).ThesemodeswerethendisplayedontheHUD anddown-
linked to thecontrolroom.
Becausea 1-to 2-secfadeexistedbetweenthemodes,theHUD modeindicationwouldbe "X"
sothatthepilot wasawarethata modetransitionwasin progress.TheRFCSdisengagesrequests
throughthe paddleswitch functionedfrom anymode.A strakefailure indication from the SIB
would forceamodetransitionbackto theTV mode.Early in thedesignthedecisionto allow the
pilot to remainin TV following astrakefailurewasmade.TheTV canprovidegreatercontrolpow-
er to recoverfrom abnormalconditionsthat might occurwhenrecoveringfrom a strakefailure.
This failure indicationwaslatchedin theRFCSsoftwaresothatthefailure reasoncouldbedeter-
minedin the control roombeforethepilot wasallowedto reselecta strakemode.To limit the
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aircraft to benignflight conditionsduringmodeselections,the listed modetransitionlimits for
TV _ STV andSTV _ Sweredefinedin thesoftwareasdonefor RFCSarming.
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Figure 15. The ANSER mode transitions.
Table 1 lists the mode transition limits. The limit on AOA was a place holder in the software
in case a smaller limit was desired. For S ---) TV transitions, these limits were set at or near maxi-
mum sensor values to allow the pilot to select the TV mode throughout the RFCS envelope.
Table 1. Mode transition limits.
Signal Limit
Roll rate
Pitch rate
Yaw rate
Lateral acceleration
Normal acceleration
Angle of attack
Sideslip rate inertial
< +30°/sec
< _ 15 °/sec
< _ 15°/sec
< +0.5 g
>-I gor<2g
< +360 °
< +5°/sec
OBES and Dial-A-Gain.
Although not new for ANSER, the OBES was used extensively during ANSER research
flights. The OBES portion of the RFCS software was originally designed as a structural
mode excitation system, but it has evolved into a multidisciplinary, on-aircraft test facility. The
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growing numberof useful applicationsincludesaerodynamicmeasurementsandflow visualiza-
tion, parameteridentification, control law evaluation,in-flight control law variability, handling
qualitiesandinner loop stability analysis,simulationmodelverification,andgroundtestof new
aircraftsystems.
Theinitial setof researchTV controllawsrequiredactivein-flight structuralmodeexcitation.
This requirementresultedfrom marginalaeroservoelasticstabilityanalysispredictions.Different
excitationconceptswereconsidered.An extemalmechanicalexcitationsystemwasnot selected
becauseof its intrusivenatureandintegrationdifficulties.Another concept considered was to use
the remotely augmented vehicle (RAV) facility. The RAV facility has been a critical test facility
at DFRC for remote maneuver guidance, control augmentation, and remote piloting. This facility
could be used to up-link an excitation signal to the aircraft which would then need to be received,
processed and passed to the RFCS. The signal would then be summed to the desired control surface
command. By driving the selected control surfaces at varying frequencies, the structural modes of
the aircraft could be excited. The frequencies of the structural modes of interest were well within
the bandwidth of the F- 18 actuators.
The OBES was created by adapting this latter concept. Taking advantage of the imbedded and
programmable RFCS, the functions of the RAV facility were effectively brought onboard the air-
craft. With this OBES configuration, the RAV functions were performed internal to the aircraft,
thus eliminating the problems associated with the remote facility. Some of the problems addressed
include the up-link and down-link range and dropout problems, on-aircraft receiver requirements,
signal processing, redundancy management, and time delay. Other RAV drawbacks eliminated by
the OBES include the need for manpower support during the flights as well as dependence on a
complex system of hardware and software.
The OBES generates the desired function and sums the signal to the desired RFCS control law
path (fig. 16). The function generation logic and signal superposition are performed within the
RFCS Ada software, and the selected OBES function identifier is down-linked to the control room
for test point verification. For these flight test points, the test pilot would simply initiate the appro-
priate OBES maneuver and maintain flight conditions. The OBES performs the selected maneuver.
Lateral stick
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stick command
Lateral stick
deadband
OBES rudder
command
Rudder
command
___ Rudder limit
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Figure 16. The OBES command summation examples.
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For ANSERflight testing,theOBESwasusedfor nosestrakeaerodynamicmeasurementsand
flow visualization,nosestrakeloadsflight clearance,closed-andopen-loopparameteridentifica-
tion andnosestrakepreflight built-in testexcitation.
A dial-a-gaincapability wasaddedto the RFCSto add flexibility to the flight test of the
ANSERcontrol laws. Theoption of eight separategainsetselectionswasmadeavailable.For
ANSER, threegain setswere definedfor the longitudinalaxis with onegain set definedasa
default,baselineset.ThesegainsetswereselectedthroughthecockpitDDI, andthecurrentgain
setwasdisplayedon theHUD anddown-linkedfor controlroommonitoring.Gainselectionwas
allowed throughoutthe flight envelopebefore or after RFCSengagement;however,with any
RFCSdisengagement,heselectedgainsetdefaultedbackto thebaselinegainset.
g-Disengage
The RFCS and Ada software were originally intended to be a class B system to reduce the
software testing and verification requirements (ref. 3). Although many definitions of class B exist,
in general this designation meant that an error in the RFCS or software could not result in loss
of aircraft.
Vehicle modifications required by the installation the TVCS and ANSER systems added a
significant amount of weight at the extreme fore and aft ends of the aircraft. Because of this "flying
dumbbell" configuration, expected load levels in the forward fuselage area during maneuvering
flight were significantly increased. Structural analysis indicated that a reduction in symmetric and
asymmetric maneuvering load limits was required (table 2). Software modifications to enforce
the new limits could not be made to the basic flight control system, so a flight operations limit
was imposed.
Table 2. Production F/A-18 and HARV load limits.
Load limit Production F/A- 18 HARV
Symmetric -3.0 g to 7.6 g -2.0 g to 5.4 g
Asymmetric 0 g to 6.0 g 0 g to 4.2 g
Although the flight operations limit specifically restricts the pilot from maneuvering above the
symmetric and asymmetric load limits, the aircraft still has the command authority and control
power available to significantly exceed the aircraft structural limits in the lower right-hand corner
of the RFCS envelope (h = 15,000 ft, M = 0.7). During software testing, it was found that hard-over
stabilator commands from the RFCS could not be countered by the pilot in enough time to prevent
an over-g. As a result to balance the risk of an undetected RFCS software fault with the general
desire to design and test in a class B environment, a function to predict and reduce the possibility
of an over-g was implemented in the RFCS.
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This function, called the g-disengage, was only active at high dynamic pressures where an
over-g was possible. Structural loads in the critical forward fuselage area were estimated from
flight control accelerations and rates and projected ahead in time with a lead filter. When the pro-
jected load exceeded the computed load limits, the RFCS stayed engaged. However, the RFCS sta-
bilator command was ignored, and the stabilator was driven to the basic F/A-18 stabilator
command. Once the stabilator got within 5 ° of the basic system stabilator command, the RFCS was
disengaged. In this way, the g-disengage reduced the potential of an over-g caused by a failure in
the RFCS. It dynamically limited the stabilator commands.
Once the g-disengage software was implemented, it was complied and stored in a designated
portion of the EEPROM. This designation was done so that when software updates were made,
a bit-for-bit comparison could be completed using the previous version of g-disengage. This
comparison ensured that any software updates to the RFCS did not affect the g-disengage portion
of the software.
SYSTEM INTEGRATION AND TESTING
The ANSER system was extensively tested before it was integrated into the aircraft. Testing
was broken into four levels: card level testing, box level, integrated system, and system validation.
The designer performed card level testing to check the design and build of the card. Each card was
tested against the design as much as possible. The chassis wiring was also tested at this level.
Box level testing was a more intensive test and was integrated with an actuator and an actuator
model. Integrated system testing included the FCS and the actuators or actuator models. System
validation testing included the actuators or actuator models, FCC, and closed-loop simulation of
the vehicle dynamics.
An actuator model was developed for the integration and testing of the strake system. The
strake actuator model was designed to accurately model the response of the forebody strake actu-
ators in software. The model receives strake commands as inputs from the SIB and hinge moment
from the simulation, and this mode gives out the spool and ram positions, voltages, and ram veloc-
ity as outputs to the SIB and then as outputs to the simulation. The actuator model calculates spool
and ram positions in normal operational mode or in trail-damped mode. The models are imple-
mented on a Versa Model Eurocard (VME) system which operates at 800 Hz.
Box level testing checked the box and actuator interfaces. A function generator replaced the
FCC and provided the command voltages to the interface box. The initial tests verified the interface
box under steady-state conditions. A voltage was applied, and the actuator or actuator model posi-
tion was verified. Once the steady-state inputs were evaluated, a full-scale ramp input was then
used to evaluate the time history of the interface box and of the actuator and actuator model. After
the ramps, a frequency response test was run to verify the dynamics of the servoloop. Failures were
then introduced while a ramp was input to verify that the failure-detection circuits operated as
expected. Table 3 indicates the failures that were introduced and in what level of testing these fail-
ures were performed. After the failure-detection tests were run, BIT was tested, and failures were
introduced to verify that the implementation detected the failures properly.
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Table3.Integrationtestingmatrix.
Failures
Card Box Integrated
level testing system
System
validation
Ram position,
high open
Yes One channel One channel
Two channels with actuator Two channels
and actuator model
One channel
Two channels
Ram position,
low open
Yes No No One channel
Two channels
Spool position,
high open
Yes One channel One channel
Two channels with actuator Two channels
and actuator model
One channel
Two channels
Spool position,
low open
Yes No No One channel
Two channels
FCC command
to strake
interface box,
open
Yes One channel One channel
Two channels with actuator Two channels
and actuator model
One channel
Two channels
Strake interface
command to
actuator or
actuator
model, open
No One channel One channel
Two channels with actuator Two channels
and actuator model
One channel
Two channels
LVDT excitation,
open
No One channel One channel
Two channels with actuator Two channels
and actuator model
One channel
Two channels
Pressure discrete,
open
Yes One channel One channel
Two channels with actuator Two channels
and actuator model
One channel
Two channels
Power, open Yes One channel One channel
Two channels with actuator Two channels
and actuator model
One channel
Two channels
Shut off valve, Yes One channel One channel One channel
open Two channels with actuator Two channels Two channels
and actuator model
Servocurrent, Yes One channel One channel One channel
open Two channels with actuator Two channels Two channels
and actuator model
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Threemajoranomalieswerediscoveredduringbox level testing.First, a groundingproblem
requiredthe additionof a second1.832-MHzclock insteadof relying ona singleclock to drive
bothservoloopboards.Second,asignerrorwasdiscoveredin thespoolpositionversuscommand
currentalgorithm, requiring minor redesign.Third, the counterusedto stepthrough the BIT
sequencewould intermittentlyresetorarbitrarilyjump to adifferenttest.Troubleshootingrevealed
asharedgroundbetweenthedigitalBIT circuitry andtheanalogcircuitry on thefailure-detection
board.This problemwasdocumentedbut wasdeemeda nuisance.No fix was implemented,so
theproblemwascarriedthroughto theaircraftandoftenrequiredmultipleBIT operationsbefore
eachflight.
Integratedsystemtestingwasthe next level. The RFCSprovidedthe ability to programthe
OBESto generateidenticalrampsandsquarewavesasthosefromthefunctiongenerator.Thetests
which hadpreviouslybeenperformedduringbox level testingwere repeatedwith the interface
box, actuatoror actuatormodel,andFCC integrated.The only discrepancynotedduringsystem
integrationtestingwasalackof fidelity in thestrakeactuatormodel.Thismodelwasimprovedand
testingcontinued.
Uponcompletionof integratedsystemtesting,systemlevelvalidationwasrun.A high-fidelity
simulationof thevehicledynamicswas integratedwith the interfacebox, FCC, andactuatorsor
actuatormodels.The flight softwarewas installedin the RFCS,andtestingsimilar to that per-
formed in the integratedsystemstesting wasperformed(table 3). Time histories, frequency
responses,and inducedfailureswere run at variousflight conditions.The MC modifications,
RFCS,andtotal systemwerevalidated.Thisvalidationincludeddisplaysandswitchologyaswell
asfailures,modetransitions,timehistories,andfrequencyresponses.Duringvalidationtesting,a
singlefailure in theFCCcommandto theSIBwouldresultin theactuatortrying to respondtoboth
commandssimultaneously.Both channels'servovalvecommandsversusspoolpositionmonitors
would fail, placingtheactuatorin trail-dampedmode.Thissinglepointfailurecombinedwith the
discoverythattrail-dampedisanunacceptablefailuremode,resultedindevelopingandimplemen-
tating thestrakeretractsystem.
Additionally certainconditions,suchasa singlefailure in a main ram LVDT signal,could
causea failure in the secondchannel.Such failuresalso resultedin the trail-dampedmode.
Troubleshootingrevealedthat the failure in the first channelram positiondrove the command
currentin thepartnerchannelhighermomentarilyto compensate.The servopositionversuscom-
mandcurrentmonitor failurediscretewouldmomentarilytrip andthenself-reset.This transition
typically lasted20 to 25msec.Theopticalrelaywhichcontrolstheactuatorshutoffvalveis spec-
ified to recoverfrom transitionsin lessthan50msec.Thatrelaywould latch to a failed stateand
couldnotbe resetbecauseof thedesigndecisionnot to includea manualreset.
Aircraft integrationtestingwas fairly limited becauseof high confidencein the simulation
implementation.Testingconsistedof time historiesin thethreeRFCSmodes.Openwire failures
were inducedto verify failure-detection,andcockpit functionswereverified. The only known
anomalywastheBIT problemdiscoveredduringintegrationtesting.
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RFCSVERIFICATION
With theimplementationof theg-disengage software, the class B designation of the rest of the
RFCS software was used to define the level of verification testing required before flight. Indepen-
dent testing has shown that the RFCS envelope limits and the OBES are the only elements of RFCS
which affect flight safety.* Since those tests, the vane load limiting was also determined to affect
flight safety. With this affect in mind, the ANSER verification testing requirements were defined.
The RFCS envelope limits (15,000 ft < h < 45,000 ft, M < 0.7) were verified. A bit-for-bit compar-
ison of the g-disengage software was performed to verify that g-disengage executable did not
change from a previously verified version. The RFCS software configuration identifier was veri-
fied to ensure that the software release identification was correct. Thrust-vectoring vane system
(TVVS) command limiters were verified in the lower right- and left-hand corners of the envelope.
Because the OBES could also affect safety of flight, each OBES maneuver was flown at flight con-
ditions starting in the lower right-hand corner of the envelope to determine where in the flight en-
velope the individual maneuver affected flight safety. Once this determination was completed, a
flight operations limit was defined for that maneuver. Although some informal testing was per-
formed to gain confidence in the operation of the software, no other RFCS software testing was
required. Any errors existing in the software were considered to be only mission critical. The
project decided to accept this risk knowing that a complete verification would take an unreasonable
amount of time.
FLIGHT TEST MONITORING
Flight test monitoring of the RFCS and the processor FCS for phase 2 was done on two control
room display pages. An FCS display page was designed to look similar to the FCS DDI display in
the aircraft (fig. 17). This page displays leading-edge flap, trailing-edge flap, aileron, rudder, sta-
bilator and TVV position and failure status; lateral stick, longitudinal stick and rudder pedal posi-
tions, and failure status; and FCS analog and discrete I/O failure status. The RFCS display page
was used to monitor the RFCS I/O and system functionality during RFCS engagement (fig. 18).
Aircraft rates, accelerations, AOA, and rates of change in angles of attack and sideslip, 6t and _,
were displayed with RFCS arm and RFCS engage-disengage limit windows. The TVVS com-
mands and positions were displayed with maximum limits. The RFCS Mach number and altitude
were displayed with RFCS envelope limits incorporated. Engine parameters included power lever
angle (PLA), nozzle area, turbine discharge pressure, and gross thrust. The RFCS abort and fail-
to-arm flags were also displayed. The TVVS temperatures and aircraft loads as a function of per-
cent of maximum allowable were also displayed to allow for the option of not having a structural
loads engineer in the control room.
*Earls, M.R., "Nasty RFCS Test Report," HA92-84-601, 1992. (This report is an unpublished working paper and
is not available to the public.)
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Figure 17. The HARV RFCS monitoring page.
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In addition to the existing RFCS and FCS display pages used on phase 2, other parameters were
incorporated into display pages for the phase 3 (ANSER) portion of flight test. A new ANSER
parameter display system (PDS) display page was designed for monitoring strake actuator com-
mands versus actuator positions, servocurrents, spool positions, and failure-detection circuitry dur-
ing flight (fig. 19). A BIT index was displayed for preflight BIT monitoring. The strake go flag,
ANSER mode (TV, STV, S), trail-damped indication, FCS caution, and strake retract switch posi-
tion were also displayed. The FCS caution was displayed to alert the systems engineer that an FCS
problem existed. The systems engineer could then display the FCS display page to troubleshoot the
FCS problem. The RFCS display page was modified for phase 3 to include ANSER mode, strake
command, strake position, strake go flag, and current gain set selected. To indicate an ANSER
mode transition (for example, TV _ STV) to the systems engineer, the ANSER mode would flash
at approximately 5 Hz during the transition (figs. 18-19). Some of the more critical parameters,
such as ANSER mode, trail damped, and strake go, were displayed on the ANSER PDS and the
RFCS display pages. This combination display reduced the systems engineer's scan during flight
test when critical calls to the test pilot, flight controller, or both, were required. To isolate possible
RFCS anomalies from SIB anomalies, the RFCS page displayed command and position data from
the RFCS, and the ANSER PDS page displayed command and position data from the SIB.
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Figure 19. The ANSER PDS page.
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FLIGHT TEST RESULTS
The ANSER system was installed and flown for the final 89 flights of the HARV flight
program. With one exception, flight performance of the system was generally successful. The
servoposition versus command current test would fail and self-reset during large amplitude lateral-
directional maneuvers in the 30 ° to 50 ° angle-of-attack range. Typically, one channel of one actu-
ator would indicate a failure. Troubleshooting revealed a divergence in the RFCS command to the
servoloop between the two channels of the affected actuator. The two independent servoloops
would command a different servovalve position based on the FCC commands. The servovalve
would respond to a position midway between the two commands. When the commands diverged
sufficiently, the failure-detection algorithm would declare a failure (fig. 20). The test tolerance was
increased to allow the commands to differ by 8.5 ° or nearly 10 percent of full scale. This increase
reduced the frequency of the failures, but it did not eliminate them completely.
Left atrake
command,
inches of
stroke
2.0
1.5
1.0
.5
-.5
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Channel B command i'_
Strske fail I
-- /I I
|
_ _,'
,\
I I I I I
.2 .4 .6 .8 1.0
Time, sec 960419
Figure 20. Example of in-flight command miscomparison.
Investigations into the cause of the divergent FCC commands are ongoing. The RFCS channels
appear to be receiving different values for lateral stick commands resulting from the quad signal
selection algorithm in the FCC. The high gain nature of the RFCS control laws amplifies this dif-
ference and results in the different strake commands. Documentation of these findings is hindered
somewhat because internal FCC data are only available on two of the four channels through the
MIL-STD-1553 data bus. Project scheduling concerns prohibited a resolution of this problem;
therefore, a set of research data in the flight regime affected was not obtained. The probable fix
would have been a persistence counter in the RFCS on the strake go discrete. These failures were
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generallyone or two frames in length. A five-flame persistence on the strake go discrete would
have allowed the S or STV mode to remain engaged while the failure self-reset.
Other problems encountered in the flight program were minimal. An integrated circuit failure
occurred causing loss of one flight for repair. A failed spike suppression diode in an unrelated
system caused corruption of strake power. This diode failure resulted in an self-start of the ANSER
BIT logic in flight. The retract system was used, and the aircraft was recovered normally.
LESSONS LEARNED
Several lessons were learned in the development of the ANSER system. These lessons can be
applied to future system integration efforts. An assumption was made early in the program that
placing the actuators to trail-damped was an acceptable failure mode. This assumption drove a
great deal of the system design and eventually proved false. A substantial effort was then required
to implement the strake retract system. Had the assumption been disproved earlier in the design
phase, the normal failure mode could have been to a strake-closed configuration.
The decision to have failures automatically reset was adequate in the majority of cases, but
when a main ram LVDT failure occurred, the partner channel servocurrent versus spool position
monitor failed and reset faster than the electronics could recover. This rapid automatic reset result-
ed in an unresettable trail-damped condition. The addition of a manual reset capability along with
the automatic reset would have alleviated this problem.
Monitoring the preflight built-in test manually rather than automatically proved to be a valid
approach for this application. This monitoring eliminated the development of a processor-based
system to perform this function.
A persistence counter on the strake go discrete may have prevented the reversions to TV mode
in the 30 ° to 50 ° angle-of-attack range during the flight phase. Additionally, a cross-channel com-
parison of RFCS parameters may have detected the command miscomparisons, and a routine could
have been implemented to average these signals.
In the RFCS area, increased throughput and ROM would have eased the software design.
Streamlining the code a great deal was necessary to accommodate these limitations of the RFCS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A system to enhance high-angle-of-attack flight handling qualities was developed by NASA
Langley Research Center and integrated into the F-18 High Alpha Research Vehicle by NASA
Dryden Flight Research Center. The actuated nose strake for enhanced rolling system proved reli-
able throughout 89 test flights. This system consists of two actuated control surfaces installed on a
specifically constructed radome.
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Actuatorcontrolwasperformedbyastrakeinterfaceboxwithcommandsgeneratedbythecon-
trol lawsresidingin theresearchflight controlsystem(RFCS).Thesecontrol laws consistedof
threemodes:thrust vectoring(TV), strakesandthrustvectoring(STV), andstrake(S). TheTV
modeusesthe TV systemfor longitudinal andlateral-directionalcontrol.The strakesarenot
commandedin thismode.Thesystemrevertsto theTV modein theeventof astrakefailure.The
STV modeusesTV for longitudinalcontrol anda combinationof strakeswith TV for lateral-
directionalcontrol.TheSmodeusesTV for longitudinalcontrolandstrakesfor lateral-directional
control.TheRFCSalsoresidesin theonboardexcitationsystemandallowsopen-andclosed-loop
functionsto besummedinto theRFCScontrollawsfor researchflexibility.
Extensivetestingwasperformedto qualify thesystemfor flight. This testingrevealedonema-
jor andseveralminorsystemproblems.Themajorproblemwasthatthefailuremodefor the sys-
temwhichhadbeendesignedto placethefailedstrakesin trail-dampedmodewasinadequate.This
inadequacycouldresultin a out-of-controlsituation.Thisproblemresultedin the implementation
of a manuallyactivatedretractsystemto closethestrakesif a trail-dampedsituationoccurred.
In the30° to 50° angle-of-attackrange,strakecommandswoulddiffer betweenthetwo flight
controlchannelsdriving aparticularstrake.Thisdifferenceresultedin areversionto TV mode.A
correctionwasnot implemented,andaportionof theflight researchprogramwasnotcompleted
becauseof this failure.With thisexception,theprogramwasgenerallysuccessful,andthemajority
of theresearchobjectivesweremet.
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